JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND RISK
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
2021, VOL 4, NO 2, 221–246
https://doi.org/10.30658/jicrcr.4.2.2

Nicholson School of
Communication and Media
University of Central Florida
www.jicrcr.com

SO ORDERED: A Textual Analysis
of United States’ Governors’ Press Release
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Taylor S. Voges1

and Matthew T. Binford1

1. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia,
Athens, GA, USA
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic presents a unique environment from which each individual state, in the United States, has been forced to address their publics. In order to
understand how each state has engaged with this pandemic, a textual analysis of each
state’s governor’s first press release was conducted; five thematic trends were identified. Through use of the social trust approach to risk communication and the contingency theory of strategic conflict management (using external threat variables), the
implications of these press releases are discussed.
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The year 2020 will perhaps be best remembered as the first year in
which the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, began to spread widely
around the world. By the middle of 2020, the United States had
become the global epicenter for the novel coronavirus pandemic
with millions of confirmed cases and hundreds of thousands of
deaths as a result of the virus (Johns Hopkins, 2020). Given the
rapid growth of the coronavirus and the staggeringly high numbers of cases and deaths, it is important to briefly recount what
the pandemic looked like in its earliest days in the United States.
It is certainly possible that the virus had been silently spreading in the United States before the first verified case of COVID-19.
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However, the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United
States that the public was made aware of was reported in Seattle,
Washington, in mid-January 2020 (McNamara, 2020). The arrival
of the novel coronavirus in the United States was not initially met
with widespread panic. Though relatively soon after, state governors begin to formally declare states of emergency in response to
rising cases, beginning with Governor Jay Inslee of Washington on
February 29, 2020. Notably, February 29, 2020, the day Washington State declared a state of emergency was also initially believed
to be the first coronavirus death in the United States after a patient
died in Washington (Acevedo & Burke, 2020).
This death in Washington, while it was the first COVID-19
death to be reported to the public, was not actually the first death
from the new virus. In April of 2020, medical examiners in California posthumously identified that a person in Santa Clara County
California died due to complications from the novel coronavirus
on February 6, 2020, which is several weeks before the patient in
Washington (Chappell, 2020). After Washington became the first
state to declare a state of emergency, other states quickly followed
suit. By mid-March nearly all 50 states had declared a state of
emergency, and on March 13 President Donald Trump declared
a national state of emergency (FEMA, 2020). On March 13—the
day a national state of emergency was declared—the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center noted that there were a total
of 2,157 cases in the United States. The last governor to formally
declare a state of emergency for his state was Gov. Jim Justice (R)
of West Virginia who declared a state of emergency on March 16.
This issuance of a state of emergency was done in West Virginia
before the state had even seen its first confirmed case of COVID19, though the first person in the state did test positive the next day,
on March 17 (West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 2020). As these events demonstrate, the United States’
governors dealt with the initial effects of the coronavirus before
a national state of emergency was declared. As such, the interest
for this study is state governors as they were the initial actors and
leaders during the pandemic’s early stages.
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At its core, the United States is a constitutional federal republic, which means that there is both a national governing system
that oversees the collective 50 states and local governing bodies—
both state and municipal (U.S. Government, n.d.). The leader of
the national government is the United States President while the
leader of the state government(s) is the governor. Each United
States Governor acts as a leader to his or her state, so constituents
look to their governor for guidance and leadership. To illustrate,
governors tend to respond differently to threats (e.g., Hurricane
Harvey), but these previous threats were more centralized to certain locations. The COVID-19 pandemic holistically hit the United
States—and the world—but it was still up to the different levels
of government to lead. Thus, it becomes important to understand
the United States’ state governors’ early communications with the
public. The very beginning of the pandemic in the United States is
briefly outlined from the first reported case to the day the last state
governor declared a state of emergency.
While one can consider that governors acted quickly to declare
states of emergencies in efforts to prepare their states for the novel
coronavirus, it is also worth noting that this was a general time
of confusion for many people as to what the proper response to
COVID-19 was. For example, by the summer of 2020 it was widely
accepted among the scientific community that wearing a mask
was one of the most effective ways of slowing the spread of the
novel coronavirus (CDC, 2020). However, this message was not
always one made clear to the public. At one point in early March,
Surgeon General Jerome Adams said in an interview that wearing
masks can increase one’s chances of getting the novel coronavirus
(Schreckinger, 2020). This example was brought up not to show
a shortcoming of communication from government officials, but
rather to highlight how confusing the earliest days of the COVID19 pandemic were as the public and the scientific community alike
struggled to understand this threat.
It is important to unearth as many insights as possible about
initial communications from those in positions of power, such as
state governors, to better understand how novel threats should
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be communicated. State governors are responsible for decisions
about coronavirus policy, but also are responsible for how that
policy is communicated to the public. The communication coming from their offices not only drives discourse in their state, but
can also impact how the novel coronavirus is perceived nationwide. Provided that initial communication sets the tone for the
total communications about an issue, it is, therefore, important to
review what initial communications were made. Thus, a review of
each state’s governor’s initial press release was conducted to glean
insights into the risk management strategies taken during the early
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Literature Review
This study examines the communication about the coronavirus
pandemic through a textual analysis of how each state’s governor
has approached the COVID-19 virus in a press release—situated
within risk communication framework and the contingency theory of strategic conflict management.
Risk Communication
Risk communication is a broad field of communication research—
one that is connected to various fields like public relations, communication management, and risk management. Risk management,
as defined by Stern and Fineberg (1996), includes “things, forces,
or circumstances that pose danger to people or to what they value”
(Stern & Fineberg, 1996, as cited in Rhee, 2008). Indeed, public
relations is at times considered an extension of strategic management of risks (Rhee, 2008). Organizations can use public relations
as a way to develop risk management strategies and communicate
with stakeholders during these risky times (Rhee, 2008). Effective
risk management requires communication practitioners to help
stakeholders understand how the organization made a rational
decision concerning the risk and how the decision upholds both
the stakeholders’ and organization’s ideas, interests, and values
(Brummette & Sisco, 2018).
Public relations practitioners, and any other type of risk management team, need to be aware of the differences and prepare
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strategies that are tailored to each situation. As part of this preparedness, scholars have worked to develop various approaches
to risk communication, such as the mental models approach (e.g.,
Morgan et al. 2002), the convergence communication approach
(e.g., Rogers & Kincaid, 1981), the three-challenge approach (e.g.,
Rowan, 1991), the hazard plus outrage approach (e.g., Sandman,
1987), and the social trust approach.
Each of these approaches center around a different risk communication core. For mental models, the core is found in cognitive psychology and is used to (1) help identify to whom the risk
communication should be directed to and (2) the processing of the
risk communication (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013). The mental
models approach is used to develop audience-centered perspectives on different risks. In contrast, the convergence communication approach views risk communication as a long and iterative
process that is constantly based around the organization communicating and the audience it is communicating with—values and
preferences (culturally or otherwise) constantly affect the process
(Lundgren & McMakin, 2013).
The approach of interest, however, is the social trust approach
to risk communication. This approach developed within an area of
social science research interested in a person’s—or an audience’s—
trust in an organization, such as a governmental institution.
Cvetkovich and Winter (2002) worked to develop this approach
through projects that he worked on for the United States, such
as with the United States Department of Agriculture. The core of
the social trust approach is based around values, evaluations, and
judgments (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Fundamentally, having
trust is seen as a way to reduce complexities and complications;
the trust is fluid, however, and has the potential to be broken
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Cvetkovich and Winter propose
that trust is part of an evaluative process—one that helps a person
make judgments. This iteration of trust is fundamental but incomplete. Trust goes beyond having confidence in another person or
in an organization. Indeed, trust is made up of inferences—both
seen and unseen—about another’s motives, attitudes, and beliefs
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Trust built on what is seen (i.e.,
actions) provides the evaluator with inferences about the actor’s
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attitudes and beliefs just as much as trust that is built on what is
unseen—something that happened at a distance with no obvious
opportunity for the evaluator to directly observe (Cvetkovich &
Winter, 2002).
Beyond what is seen and what is unseen, trust is also built on
the congruence of values (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). The evaluator takes personal values and places them against the entity being
evaluated. Similar values for the evaluator and the evaluated entity
have shown to lead to higher social trust (Earle & Cvetkovich,
1997). Further, the type of situation at hand—environmental risk
versus a health risk—helps determine the type of values at play and
to what extent those values matter (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002).
Through this approach to social trust, it is apparent that audiences use various processes to judge an organization. Social trust—
from the audience perspective of an organization—is founded
in the people’s ability to understand the organization’s goals and
values (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013). If an audience member
has negative attitudes toward an organization, any negative information they encounter regarding the organization will only work
to reinforce the distrust toward the organization (Lundgren &
McMakin, 2013). The reverse is also true: positive attitudes will
be reinforced when the audience encounters positive information
about an organization, which results in increased trust. Indeed,
social trust can be thought of as one of the most important aspects
of risk communication (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013).
The social trust approach ultimately sets the foundation for
the strategic conflict management of risks, specifically that of
COVID-19. As discussed, audiences use trust as a way to evaluate
and judge an organization’s communication—or the organization’s
presentation of a risk. The contingency theory of strategic conflict
management, in turn, presents a number of variables that organizations use to help them determine the best stance to take during
conflicts and times of uncertainty (Cancel et al., 1997). These perspectives are taken in tandem because the social trust approach to
risk communication demonstrates how imperative it is for organizations—such as governmental entities—to understand how their
social trust standings are determined by their audiences. Further,
the contingency theory of strategic conflict management views
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stance-making as fluid and depending on an organization’s evaluation of the situation. In this case, the situation—COVID-19—is
viewed through the contingency theory because it is imperative to
see how the local leaders of the United States presented the issue
to their respective constituents.
Contingency Theory
Contingency theory, often referred to as the “it depends” theory,
attempts to account for real-world complexities (Pang et al., 2016).
The core of contingency theory is the continuum, which attributes the flexibility organization’s use when determining a stance
on an issue; the continuum ranges from pure advocacy to pure
accommodation (Cancel et al., 1997). The stance an organization
is said to take depends on a variety of factors, 86 in total, and how
such factors influence organizational stance along the continuum
(Cancel et al., 1997). The contingency theory allows for a specific analysis of predetermined variables (i.e., those identified by
Cancel et al., 1997) and provides researchers with the opportunity
to analyze organizational stances in accordance with both the continuum and the variables.
It is important to note, however, that an organization’s stance
is not a legitimate enactment of all 86 variables at once; instead,
the contingency theory works to demonstrate how certain types of
variables may be more salient than others during specific situations
(Cancel et al., 1997). Based on this logic, researchers can investigate specific types of variable constructs, such as with Jin et al.
(2015). They propose five subgroups out of the total five theoretical constructs in order to determine how the grouping of variables
outweigh each other in terms of organizational decision-making.
Constructs are subgroups that contain more defined groupings of variables (Jin et al., 2015; Reber & Cameron, 2003). Within
these constructs are variables that are considered influential
based on the contingency theory (Cancel et al., 1997). Based on
the profound number of variables, it is typical for researchers to
choose which variables they consider important to their research.
Thus, for the novel coronavirus scenario, a focus on a subset of
external variables is used in order to understand how governors

228

VOGES and BINFORD

strategically communicated to their constituents about the risk of
the novel coronavirus.
External Variables

The external variables are split into five subgroups: (1) threats,
(2) industry environment, (3) general political/social environment/
external culture, (4) the external public, and (5) issue under question
(Jin et al., 2015). Each external variable subgroup includes a list of
specific variables—the specific variables of interest are within the
issue under question theoretical construct. Issue under question is
specifically of interest—as COVID-19 constituted the active issue.
Under issue under question are the variables issue size, issue stake,
and issue complexity.
Issue Under Question. The variables proposed within issue under
question include issue size, issue stake, and issue complexity. These
variables have been tested in various studies, such as with Dant
and Schul (1992), and later included in the contingency theory’s
list of variables as those considered influential regarding organizational stance decision-making (Cancel et al., 1997). An issue’s size
encompasses how an actor defines the scope of the issue itself; it is
further considered important as it helps develop norm responses
that will later serve as precedents for the issue itself (Dant & Schul,
1992). However, it is important to acknowledge the ramifications
of precedent-setting for an issue (Dant & Schul, 1992). An issue’s
stake refers to what threats, gains, or losses the issue holds over
those it could potentially affect (Dant & Schul, 1992). Further,
stake is used to better distinguish what is meant by issue size with
the former referring to the implications of the issue and the latter referring more to the scope of the issue. An issue’s complexity
is a variable that has the potential to influence conflict management actions (Dant & Schul, 1992). It is proposed that issues with
high complexity typically invoke solution tactics that include the
use of politics and bargaining while issues with low complexity
are typically solved by using problem-solving and persuasion tactics (Dant & Schul, 1992). Thus, it can be inferred that issues with
high complexity result in communication tactics that are generally
more abstract.
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Given the relative unknowns regarding the COVID-19 virus
issue (both at the time of the press releases and after), it is prudent to understand how each state’s governor chose to describe the
issue to their respective constituents. Further, an analysis of governor messaging provides general insights into each state’s chosen
risk communication tactics. Thus, the following research question
is posed:
RQ: How does each state’s governor refer to the following external factors—issue size, issue stake, issue complexity—in their initial
COVID-19 press release?

Method
This study employs a qualitative textual analysis approach to
understand the implications of each state’s governor’s response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, a textual analysis allows
for a thematic and systematic analysis of selected texts—the intent
being to garner a deeper understanding of the population by looking for commonalities and underlying trends (Fürsich, 2009).
Thus, this study employs this research technique and examined
each state’s governor’s first press release response to the COVID19 pandemic. Each press release was selected based on specific criteria: the release was the first mention of the pandemic and the
release came from the governor’s office. This study did not focus
on releases put forth by other state departments, such as the health
department. The reason for doing so is that the governor is a figurehead typically known to the public, interacts more consistently
with the public, has the authority to issue decrees, and is an elected
official. Thus, 50 press releases were analyzed—one for each state—
for thematic elements.
This textual analysis sought to analyze the first public press
releases that each state governor released dealing with the novel
coronavirus pandemic in 2020. To find this information, the
researchers went to each state government’s website and looked
for press release archives. Once found, the researchers searched
for press releases mentioning COVID-19 or the novel coronavirus pandemic. The researchers then looked for the earliest substantive press releases that included information about the state
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government and its perceptions of the novel coronavirus. The dates
of the first press releases about the COVID-19 pandemic from the
state governors ranged from January 27, 2020 (Connecticut, Lamont-D) to March 17, 2020 (Wyoming, Gordon-R).
Notably, many states’ first official press releases simply were
statements saying that reporters could expect more information
at a later predetermined time. These press releases were not considered substantive and were not included in the sample. Instead,
when the researchers found these as the first official coronavirus
statement they used the next earliest official press release. For
Arizona, the first press release from the state’s governor’s office
(Ducey-R) was a video conference, so the transcription for it was
analyzed. The press releases analyzed for this study is holistic—all
states’ governor’s press releases were included in the analysis.

Results
After reviewing each state’s governor’s initial COVID-19 press
release (n = 50), the analysis revealed four persistent themes evidencing the relative unknowns regarding the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic as seen in the United States. These themes
include COVID-19 contraction risk reassurance, a bolstering of
state actions, citizen readiness actions, and COVID-19 case travel
scapegoating. Each theme directly relates to the theoretical foundations of social trust and the contingency theory of strategic
conflict management. The press releases were specifically from
the governor’s office and averaged out to around one to two pages
each. A deeper analysis of the press releases reveals how little state
governments actually knew about COVID-19, which suggests that
their relative blasé attitude may have been attributed to the general
sense of uncertainty many felt while the virus spread across the
United States.
COVID-19 Contraction Risk Reassurance
(Issue Size and Complexity)
Throughout the press releases, it was common to find verbiage that
held tones of reassurance. The reassurance, however, came in two
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different forms—in either a reference to the low number of cases
or as an indirect downplay of the novel coronavirus itself.
Number of COVID-19 Cases (Issue Size)

State governors used the platform as a place to provide citizens
with the number of COVID-19 cases, which typically totaled out
to less than 10 (at the time of the press release): “. . . there are no
current diagnosed cases in the state, Montana . . . ” (Gov. Bullock,
MT-D); “There are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the State
of Nevada” (Gov. Sisolak, NV-D); “. . . while no one in Utah has
yet tested positive for COVID-19 . . .” (Gov. Herbert, UT-R). These
instances indirectly acknowledge the presence of COVID-19 cases
elsewhere, but they double as reassurances. Each state’s respective
citizens can take the lack of cases to mean that the state is successfully keeping the virus out of the state instead of taking the lack of
cases as meaning that the virus has not yet reached the state.
Further instances of reassurances came from describing the
well-being of a previously sick individual. Indeed, some governors
would reference how well a sick individual is doing—thus providing citizens with hope. Governor Cooper (NC-D) stated in a press
release, “. . . the person is doing well and is insolated at home.”
Additional states provided similar statements, including Governor
Cuomo (NY-D) who released a statement saying, “the patient has
respiratory symptoms, but is not in serious condition and has been
in a controlled situation since arriving to New York.” These statements came with assumptions that states had control over the contracted cases—again lending to the reassurance of their citizens.
This type of reassurance can potentially be construed as accidental
over-reassurance regarding the severity of the novel coronavirus.
Downplaying COVID-19 (Issue Complexity)

The time frame of these press releases—spanning from late January
to the middle of March in 2020—demonstrates the beginning
attempts at communicating about a virus that is virtually unknown.
Some of these communication attempts resulted in a downplay of
the novel virus itself—along with its severities. Governor Pritzker
(IL-D) released a statement that included the following:
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The immediate health risk to the state remains low. While the latest
available information suggests that person-to-person spread will continue to occur and additional cases are likely to be identified in the
United States, most cases of COVID-19 cause a mild illness. In very
rare cases people infected with the virus have died. Additionally, to
date, data shows that children are less likely to become ill. (Gov. Pritzker, IL-D)

Other governors used similar language in their initial press
releases including—but not limited to—Governor Beshear (KYR), “. . . even though Kentuckians are at low risk for this virus
. . .”; Governor Little (ID-R), “. . . the individual risk for coronavirus in Idaho is still low . . .”; Governor DeSantis (FL-R), “. . .
the threat COVID-19 poses to Florida remains low . . .”; Governor
Mills (MA-D), “. . . no cases of coronavirus in Maine as of today,
and the risk to our state remains low. . . .” These instances provide
their stakeholders with an indirect downplay of the virus’s potential severity.
Governors—from multiple states—provided their constituents
with verbiage that indirectly downplayed the virus’s severity. Similarly, the inclusion of the number of cases—or even the lack of a
COVID-19 case in a state—contributed to a reassured public. Even
though these press releases were released in the early stages of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the “low risk for the virus” statements indirectly reassured citizens far more than necessary.
COVID-19 Case Travel Scapegoating (Issue Stake)
States repeatedly mentioned that those who should most be concerned with contracting the novel coronavirus were those who
had recently traveled to places that were thought to be COVID-19
hotspots. Many governor’s offices such as Kelly’s (KS-D) specifically noted that individuals should only isolate if they have:
Recently traveled to China, Iran, Italy, Japan and South Korea and have
developed fever with lower respiratory symptoms including cough
and shortness of breath within 14 days of your travel, or have had contact with someone with a laboratory-confirmed case of COVID-19.
(Gov. Kelly, KS-D)
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Another instance of a state governor’s office discussing citizens
traveling as the way the novel coronavirus is spreading in their
state comes out of Indiana where they note that,
“This morning, Gov. Holcomb and the Indiana State Department of
Health confirmed the first case of coronavirus in a Marion County
resident with a recent history of travel to a Boston event tied to several
cases in other states.” (Gov. Holcomb, IN-R)

Though many governors’ offices noted the dangers of traveling to countries that were coronavirus hotspots, or in some cases
even states that were coronavirus hotspots, most downplayed
the possibility of person-to-person transmission within their
own states. Few states specifically mentioned the possibility that
the novel coronavirus could be widely spread from person-toperson among those who had not recently traveled. Connecticut is
one of the few states that noted that there was a significant danger
that COVID-19 could be spread between individuals who had not
been to China or another coronavirus hotspot. Instead the governor’s office in Connecticut hypothesized how the virus could
be spread between individuals noting that this virus is similar to
SARS and MERS:
When person-to-person spread has occurred with MERS and SARS, it
is thought to have happened via respiratory droplets produced when
an infected person coughs or sneezes, like how influenza and other
respiratory pathogens spread. Spread of SARS and MERS between
people has generally occurred between close contacts. (Gov. Lamont,
CT-D)

Bolstering of State Actions (Issue Complexity)
Governors used these press releases as an opportunity to show how
well the states were handling the COVID-19 virus. These instances
typically came through in the form of state preparedness or in referencing how other states were faring in comparison to their own.
Governor Kemp’s office (GA-R) released a statement that included
the following, “. . . fortunately, the Peach State boasts some of the
world’s most advanced healthcare experts . . . to make sure that
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we are ready for any scenario.” Governor Edwards (LA-D) stated,
“. . . Louisiana has been preparing since the COVID-19 outbreak
in mainland China.” Governor Ige (HI-D) mentioned a specific
healthcare liaison and professed his faith in this expert’s ability.
Notably, Governor Herbert (UT-R) put Utah’s number of cases
(at the time, zero) against that of the neighboring states. These
instances demonstrate how different states used their preparedness tactics and overall virus readiness as a way to demonstrate
competency. Governor Sisolak (NV-D) provided the following
statement:
I know that took a long time, but I want Nevadans to understand the
large-scale collaboration taking place across the state, and the commitment of each of the individuals who have been working on this
issue for months. They represent hundreds of more Nevadans in their
respective fields and regions they serve—all waking up every day with
the same mission: to prepare and protect the health and safety of the
public. (Gov. Sisolak, NV-D)

Like many others, this demonstrates how governors attempted to
provide citizens with evidence about how the situation is being
taken seriously and is given much thought. Essentially, these statements applauded their own efforts.
Many initial COVID-19 press releases included mentions
of a new state task force—including mentions of the highlyqualified members. Governor Abbot (TX-R), Governor Gordon
(WY-R), Governor Scott (VT-R), Governor Lee (TN-R), and Governor Bullock (MO-D) are among the governors that cited their
coronavirus task force efforts. However, some of these announcements only included the development of a task force (and potentially a list of experts) with little mention of the task force purpose
beyond the coronavirus, “. . . to help us be even better prepared,
this group of experts will work closely with me and my administration, along with local, state, and federal agencies as we continue
to monitor any potential developments” (Gov. Lee, TN-R).
Citizen Readiness Actions (Issue Stake)
Many of the sample texts included basic instructions for citizens as
to how they can protect themselves from COVID-19. A recurring
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message found in many of the press releases was that the best
method for protecting oneself was similar to how one would protect themselves from the flu: “the best way to prevent infection is to
take precautions to avoid exposure to this virus, which are similar
to the precautions you take to avoid the flu” (Gov. Abbott TX-R).
In addition to abstractly telling people to protect themselves in the
same way one would protect themselves from the flu it was common for states to have a bullet point list of concrete steps residents
could take to best protect themselves and their families, such as
this partial statement from the Virginia governor’s office:
Although COVID-19 is not spreading in Virginia and the risk here
is low, officials said Virginians can take precautions to prevent the
potential spread of this disease:
▶ Avoid close contact with people who are sick.
▶ Avoid touching your eyes, nose, and mouth with unwashed
hands.
▶ Wash your hands often with soap and warm water for at least
20 seconds.
▶ Use alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60 percent
alcohol if soap and water are unavailable.
▶ Cover your cough or sneeze with a tissue, then throw the tissue
in the trash.
(Gov. Northam VA-D)

This list from the governor’s office of Virginia is one example of the
bulleted lists of COVID-19 precautions found in the press releases.
This concrete language can be very important so that people
have simple and easy to follow instructions; however, it should
be noted that often the language states used to give these instructions often invoked feelings of condescension—as if a parent were
speaking to a child. Most notably, before listing some of the ways
Nevadans can slow the spread of coronavirus the governor’s press
release stated, “I realize this is going to sound a bit like the advice
I used to give my daughters when they were little, but please bear
with me” (Gov. Sisolak NV-D).

Discussion
While the lack of information about a novel virus is to be
expected at the onset of a pandemic, the communication tactics
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and language used by governors in their initial COVID-19 press
releases did not appropriately set the tone for what would become
a global pandemic. Cvetkovich and Winters (2008) provides ample
logic and reasoning behind social trust: the evaluator—in this case
various clusters of American constituents—process and ultimately
judge the entity being evaluated—the U.S. governors. Provided
the results, it is apparent that the U.S. governors’ foundation for
addressing the COVID-19 pandemic was incomplete.
Given the rather sporadic types of press releases, it is unclear as
to whether or not a majority of the states had a set communication
risk plan in place. Indeed, less than 10 states referred to the overall
issue complexity of the issue and, when they did refer to the issue
complexity, the statements were more overreaching than definitive. Governors did not use the press release platform to emphasize the unknown elements of this novel coronavirus. Instead, the
press releases heavily reiterated the number of cases (or the lack
thereof) and the low probability of the coronavirus reaching their
specific state.
In references to the low risk, governors chose to provide either
comparisons or mentions of the virus in places outside of their
specific state. This specificity is reflective of the external variable
size—governors reflected on the issue’s size by using other locations’ interactions with the virus as a way to either reassure their
citizens or downplay the risk to the immediate state. Thus, the
issue size is present but the legitimacy of the issue size as relevant
to the actual state at hand was considered minimal in virtually all
press releases. The contingency theory encapsulates organizational
stance movement as organizations deliver communications (Cancel et al., 1997; Jin et al., 2015) and, looking at the initial COVID-19
press releases, it is clear that governors used the issue size as a way
to advocate for their own thoughts on the novel coronavirus. Governors referred to the virus and its impact as if in a vacuum that
included only the state in question. Thus, COVID-19’s issue size
was indirectly used to reassure rather than as a platform for providing citizens with communication about potential unknowns.
An issue’s stake helps establish how involved those affected
will become with the assumption that higher stakes lead to higher
levels of involvement (Dant & Schul, 1992). In terms of stake as
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related to the novel coronavirus, virtually no governors provided
information that referred to tangible losses, such as loss of life.
It is important to note that the number of cases and deaths had
not reached the thousands, as they had by midway 2020. The few
press releases that mentioned the known symptoms of COVID-19
also typically positioned the symptoms against flu symptoms. This
choice to capture the then-known symptoms of COVID-19 against
the flu symptoms points to stance choices are further reflective of
issue stake. Likening novelty to something known may be helpful,
but the downside of such an association is that the issue’s stake
is too likened to the flu. While the COVID-19 pandemic was an
increasingly ongoing and unprecedented event, the social trust
approach of risk communication blatantly describes the fallout
organizations face: audience members who have positive attitudes
toward the organization will use positive information to reinforce
their attitudes and trust in that organization (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). However, the reverse is also true, which means that state
constituents who felt that their governor’s initial response to the
pandemic was lacking were likely to have a lowered level of trust
as a result of the press release. Regardless, the press releases did not
provide definitive and tangible stakes about the novel coronavirus
issue. There was an intense lack of precaution statements about
COVID-19 and what the disease could do to a society.
While it is impossible to predict the future with precise certainty, the complete disregard for any mentions about the novel
coronavirus’s potential severity is astounding. Governors chose to
reiterate the apparent “low risk” of COVID-19 with little mention
of the ramifications of the disease itself. This apparent “low risk”
is a direct reference to the issue’s stake and, provided that these
press releases are from the states’ governor’s offices, offered constituents guidance on how to view the virus. The strategic language
used in the press releases attempted to mitigate uneasy feelings
and reassure stakeholders about COVID-19. This reassurance can
be reflexive of an attempt to gain or maintain social trust between
the state and the people, but the long-term consequences of these
stance choices were not obviously considered.
Based on the analysis, it is apparent that the press statements
made little mention of the novel virus’s complexity, which may
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be attributed to the complete lack of information about what is
at stake due to the virus. Governors prioritized reassurance of
stakeholders over communication about an unknown virus as
seen through the pattern of reassurance language present in virtually every press release. When pitted against the lack of information on the complexity of the virus, it is clear how governor
offices chose to placate their citizens instead of admitting to the
general public the unknowns about the virus. Communication
about an issue’s stakes, as described and researched by Dant and
Schul (1992), are connected to the level of involvement by way of
the message receivers. Thus, it can be inferred that the dismissal
of the novel virus complexity informs communication about the
potential stakes and—since the stakes were virtually never mentioned—influenced how citizens determined their own levels of
involvement for the coronavirus issue. While contingency theory
holds that a number of factors influence an organization’s stance,
it is important to note the weight of the issue itself is something
that the governors did not emphasize in their press releases. It is
suggestive then that other factors influenced the decision-making
for each state’s stance on the COVID-19 issue.
The COVID-19 case reassurance theme was prevalent in most
to all press releases—demonstrating how governors used these initial communication efforts to reassure and placate their constituents. While it is important to not incite mass panic upon the onset
of a novel virus, the level of reassurance found in the press releases
inferred that the virus was not something that citizens should be
concerned about. The language used had the opposite effect of a
mass panic. It provided citizens with comfort, a sense of hope, and
potentially gave citizens the go-ahead to dismiss any real concerns
about the severity of the virus. Governors typically included the
number of cases in their states—and at the time most were at zero
or one—and then proceeded to use language that inferred that
the virus would not reach the state or was contained by way of
state preparedness measures. Despite these measures, virtually no
statements then referenced the complexities surrounding a novel
virus. This attempt to reassure constituents lends to conversations
of social trust. The references to personal, state connections (i.e.,
“Nevadans” or “Arizonians”) demonstrates how the governors and
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state entities are attempting to provide constituents with common
ground and values to rally around. The appeal to immediate state
safety is a similar appeal to congruent values—assuming that the
constituents are invested in their state actions. Though the values
important for a situation are in part determined by the situation
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002), it is clear that the states attempted
to offer their constituents with values and reassurances that would
work in favor of social trust.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of governors used the
initial COVID-19 press releases as a place to bolster state efforts
and actions. The theme, bolstering state actions, demonstrated
how some states used these communication efforts as an avenue
to showcase all their great work (e.g., taskforce creations and convening with politicians or doctors). It is important for the public
to know what their respective states are doing to work against the
impact of the novel coronavirus, but the manner in which the governors presented these efforts came off as prideful and boastful.
Indeed, some states even used other state efforts as a comparison
against their own. These references implied that some states were
acting better than others when COVID-19 was concerned. Unfortunately, this contributes to feelings of complacency or a false
sense of security as many governors made statements that include
variations of the phrase “low risk for Kentuckians” (with a substitute for the appropriate state). While some of the press releases
included information about the efforts each state made toward the
fight against the coronavirus, it is clear that some of these bolstering statements were made to make citizens proud of how well their
government was handling the situation.
COVID-19 case travel scapegoating was a trend for those states
who reported a COVID-19 case in their state. It was apparent
that governors wished to provide an explanation as to how these
affected individuals contracted the virus and such efforts included
using travel as the necessary scapegoat. This both worked to distance the infected individual(s) from the measures the state took
to minimize virus contraction and acted as a platform for the states
to tell their constituents how well their preparedness and testing
abilities worked. Again, this trend demonstrates how governors
assuaged general public concerns about COVID-19. Indeed, it is
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human nature to be curious about such matters, but the way the
statements were written made it seem like the main way to contract the virus was through travel—specifically travel to certain
areas of the world.
When it came to addressing how citizens should act, some
states either included a list of actions they likened to flu prevention
measures or forewent including preventative measures entirely.
The analysis further demonstrated how some statements included
language that came off as condescending or as if speaking to a child
(e.g., Gov. Sisolak, NV-D). Many governors reiterated the importance of handwashing by reminding their constituents of when
they (the constituents) first learned to wash hands. Some mentioned the importance of good hygiene, but they failed to mention
what this might entail. This level of condescension is appalling and
provides insight into how these elected officials see their constituents. On top of the general personal health comments, the officials
urged their constituents to treat the threat of this virus as either the
flu or another natural disaster (e.g., Gov. Wolfe, PA-D). Within the
example press releases, governors urged citizens to prepare with
weeks’ worth of supplies—stockpiling over-the-counter drugs,
food, and water. Taking the press releases in totality, however, it
becomes clear how some of the information and instructions seem
contradictory—with no mention of the issue’s stakes or complexity
but asking citizens to prepare on a natural disaster level.
Further, it can be inferred that the reassurance found in the
press releases contributed to the unintentional downplaying of the
COVID-19 virus itself. Indeed, the highest executive elected officials—de facto leaders—refused or failed to admit the unknowns
about COVID-19.
Governors are literally the highest elected official a state can
have and their statements make local, state, and federal news
cycles. Their statements have the potential to reach millions of
Americans, yet their single-minded attention toward public reassurance and state pride resulted in a drastic overlook for citizen
welfare. Each governor declares an oath that requires them to
uphold the office of the state and its citizens and such duty was
lacking during the early coronavirus times. Despite the fact that
some governors even reiterated their commitment to safeguarding
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citizens, omitting statements that referred to the issue’s complexity
and potential stake hurt their constituents. Further, it is argued
that state governors worked to maintain social trust with their
citizens, but given their ultimate stance choices—as seen through
depictions of COVID-19’s size, stake, and complexity—opened
them up to scrutiny. A hyper focus on immediate reassurance—
an attempt to speak to constituents through their predetermined
social trust contract—omitted the possibility that more, new information about the COVID-19 pandemic might change governors’
initial stances.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study only looks to state government press releases specifically from each governor’s office. The analysis focuses solely on
analyzing the press releases, but given the nature of the results,
it is important for future research to use ethical frameworks to
gain insights into the moral rightness of these press releases.
Additionally, future research can—and should—look to early press
releases from state health departments in order to understand how
health professionals (1) understood the COVID-19 pandemic and
(2) communicated that understanding to stakeholders. Health
professionals are increasingly being looked to as thought-leaders,
so an analysis of what and how these communications manifest is
of utmost importance.

Conclusion
The COVID-19 issue was a dynamic and ongoing situation—
especially during the onset of the global pandemic—even though
few governors referred to it as such. Given their prestigious powers
and elected status, it is assumed that governors act with the best
interest of their constituents at heart. However, the insights illustrate how the governors’ attitudes toward the complexity of this
novel virus set the tone for their constituents—how self-serving
some of the communications was—with states applauding their
lack of cases and their efforts to keep the virus out of their states.
Despite their efforts, COVID-19 ended up reaching all 50 states
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and infected millions of people (Johns Hopkins, 2020). Months
into the outbreak, it is apparent how confused, uncertain, and
unwilling to trust some groups of people are—perhaps because
of the tone their governor set at the beginning of the pandemic.
Risk management plans are lacking. It is impossible to predict
natural disasters, but it is possible to prepare for them through
both actions and communication plans. Initial communication
efforts need to better include information relevant to constituents
with acknowledgments of shortcomings tied with their communications about state actions. While it is unknowable whether or
not better initial communication by way of each state’s governor’s
office would affect the outcome of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
United States, it is apparent that there is work to be done in terms
of risk communication and state priorities.
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